Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement by Burns, William C.G.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 7
Issue 2 Winter 2007: Climate Law Reporter 2007 Article 14
Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change
Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement
William C.G. Burns
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burns, William C.G. “Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Impacts Under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.”
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Winter 2007, 34-38, 81-82.
34WINTER 2007
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT
by Dr. William C.G. Burns*
INTRODUCTION
While the international community developed institutional
responses to climate change in the 1990s, through the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)1 and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,2 these
have proven to be wholly inadequate to the task. Resistance by
several nations, most prominently, the United States, to manda-
tory reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions led the
drafters to resort instead to “constructive ambiguities” and
“guidelines, rather than a legal commitment.”3 Thus, the
UNFCCC merely calls on the Parties in Annex I (developed
countries and economies in transition) to “aim” to return their
emissions back to 1990 levels.4
This article examines a potential international forum in
which the threat of climate
change might be addressed,
specifically the Agreement for
the Implementation of the Provi-
sions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNFSA”).5 Actions to
address climate change under
UNFSA could be salutary for
several reasons. First, the
commercial fisheries sector may
be profoundly and adversely
affected by climate change. This
includes many fish stocks regu-
lated under UNFSA: highly
migratory species, which have
wide geographic distribution
and undertake significant migrations,6 and straddling stocks,
which occur both within and beyond Exclusive Economic Zones
(“EEZs”).7 Second, the United States, both the world’s largest
emitter of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and a State with an abject
record in addressing climate change, is a Party to UNFSA, and has
played an active leadership role in its implementation.8 UNFSA
thus presents an excellent forum in which to engage the United
States, as well as other major GHG emitters, including the Euro-
pean Union and China, on climate issues. Finally, unlike the other
international fora for a where climate change actions have been
pursued to date, UNFSA provides a dispute resolution mecha-
nism with teeth.9
An article of this length necessarily cannot discuss all of the
intricate scientific and legal issues that an action of this nature
would invoke; rather, it seeks to lay a foundation for further
research and discussion. In this pursuit this article will: (1) out-
line the potential impacts of climate change on fish species, with
an emphasis on the potential impacts of climate change on
highly migratory fish species and straddling stocks; (2) provide
an overview of UNFSA and potential actions for climate change
damages under the Agreement; and (3) briefly discuss potential
barriers to such actions.
URGENCY OF EXAMINING ADDITIONAL
FORA TO ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING
While the Kyoto Protocol constituted an important step for-
ward because it established binding commitments by industrial-
ized parties to reduce emissions,10 it by no means is a panacea to
the specter of climate change. First, the United States, responsi-
ble for 25 percent of the world’s
GHG emissions, rejected the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001.11 While
the Bush administration has
touted a voluntary, technologi-
cally-driven approach,12 the
UNFCCC Secretariat recently
projected that U.S. GHG emis-
sions in 2010 will be more than
32 percent above 1990 levels,
and more than 50 percent above
1990 levels by 2020.13 To date,
the United States has failed to
present a realistic scenario for
stabilizing or reducing its GHG
emissions.
Second, it is by no means
clear that many of the Parties to the Protocol will even meet their
modest commitments under Kyoto.14 Finally, the Protocol’s ini-
tial commitments constitute only an extremely modest down
payment on what ultimately must be done to stabilize atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHG emissions. Climate researchers
have estimated that full implementation of Kyoto would reduce
projected warming in 2050 by only about one twentieth of one
degree.15 By contrast, stabilization of atmospheric GHGs will
ultimately require the global community to reduce GHG emis-
sions by 60 to 70 percent.16 This will necessitate industrialized
countries, including the United States, committing themselves to
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reductions of as much as 80 percent by the middle of the century
if developing nations are to be permitted some growth in their
emissions levels.17 It will also ultimately necessitate deep cuts
by large developing States with rapidly growing emissions, such
as China and India.18
At this point, it is difficult to be sanguine about the
prospects. While the UNFCCC Secretariat lauded the purported
“Spirit of Nairobi” at the latest Conference of the Parties held in
Kenya,19 in reality the Parties made very little progress develop-
ing a framework for long-term reductions in GHG emissions.
Rather, the focus was on adapting to climate change impacts that
increasingly seem inevitable.20
The inadequacy of domestic legislation and treaty responses
to climate change to date has led to a parallel commencement of
judicial and quasi-judicial actions. Several actions related to cli-
mate change have been initiated in national courts and regula-
tory agencies in several countries,21 as well as two actions in
international fora, the Inter-American Commission on Human




Fish species are ectothermic
(cold blooded); thus, water tem-
perature is the primary source of
environmental impact on fish,
including growth and maturity
rates, distribution and migration
patterns, and incidence of dis-
ease.24 Substantially rising
oceanic temperatures through-
out this century will likely have
negative impacts on highly
migratory and straddling stocks
species in many regions, espe-
cially those near the edge of their
temperature tolerance range. For example, the range of colder
water fish species, such as capelin, polar cod and Greenland hal-
ibut, is likely to shrink, resulting in a decline in abundance.25 A
decline in nutrient upwelling as a consequence of increased strat-
ification between warmer surface waters and colder deep water in
warming oceans could also result in a decline in big eye and yel-
low fin tuna in the central and western Pacific.26
Warming oceans could also radically change the distribu-
tion of some straddling stock and high migratory species. For
example, rising ocean temperatures could result in a shift of the
distribution of herring northward, upsetting a delicate agreement
in the Northeast between coastal States who harvest herring
within their EEZs and distant water fishing nations who fish on
the high seas.27 Should cooperative management agreements
collapse, it might lead to “strategic over fishing” of a stock that
is currently recovering from a historical decline.28 Warming in
the Pacific could similarly result in a redistribution of tuna
resources to higher latitudes, such as Japan and the western
equatorial Pacific.29
Temperature increases will also adversely affect prey
species of many straddling stocks and highly migratory species.
For example, in the North Atlantic, strong biogeographical shifts
in copepod assemblages associated with warming trends could
substantially reduce the abundance of fish in the North Sea and
ultimately result in the collapse of the stocks of cod, an impor-
tant straddling stock species.30
There may also be direct biological effects from rising lev-
els of carbon dioxide entering the oceans. By the end of this cen-
tury, projected increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide will
result in an almost threefold increase in surface ocean carbon
dioxide concentrations relative to pre-industrial levels.31 This, in
turn, could result in the average pH of the oceans falling by 0.5
units by 2100, which would translate into a three-fold increase in
the concentration of hydrogen ions, making the oceans more
acidic than they have been in 300 million years.32 Acidification
of the oceans will result in a decrease in the concentration of 
carbonate and related ions that reef building and other 
calcifying organisms33 draw upon to produce calcium car-
bonate.34 Among the species that might be severely affected
are a snail species, the pteropod.
In the Ross Sea, the subpolar-
polar pteropod Limacina helic-
ina sometimes replaces krill as
the dominant zooplankton
species in the ecosystem.35 A
recent study indicates that
increased acidification of ptero-
pod habitat in the Sea might 
ultimately result in the disap-
pearance of the species from
Antarctic waters, or shift its 
distribution to lower latitudes.36
The potential exclusion of
pteropods from other polar and
subpolar regions could also have
negative impacts on several straddling stock species for which it
is a prey species.37 
Given the severe impacts that climate change may have on
straddling stocks and high migratory species, it is germane to
next assess the prospects for enhancing their protection through
the primary international legal instrument for their management
and conservation. 
OVERVIEW OF UNFSA
The Third United Nations Conference of the Law of Sea
convened in 1973 and culminated nine years later in the adop-
tion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”).38 UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and cur-
rently has 148 parties.39 UNCLOS consists largely of provisions
for the regulation of fisheries, with an emphasis on the sovereign
rights of coastal States to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
living natural resources, including fish stocks, within their
respective 200-mile EEZs.40
While many have characterized UNCLOS as “a constitution
for the oceans,”41 it provides only general governing principles
It is by no means clear
that many of the Parties
to the Protocol will 




for the management of straddling stocks and high migratory
species. In cases where stocks are found within the EEZs of two
or more coastal States, or an EEZ and an area beyond it, UNC-
LOS merely requires that the pertinent fishing States “seek” to
agree upon management measures either directly or through
sub-regional or regional organizations.42 In the case of highly
migratory species, coastal States and other States with nationals
fishing in the region are exhorted to cooperate directly or
through international organizations “with a view” to ensuring
conservation and optimal utilization.43 A proposal by some
coastal States for an arbitration clause was beaten back by dis-
tant-water fishing nations and subsequently withdrawn.44
The lack of binding obligations in UNCLOS for high migra-
tory species and straddling stocks was largely attributable to the
fact that fishing in these regions was not considered to be a
major issue in the early 1980s.45 However, as coastal States
began to claim their rights within their EEZs, large distant-water
fishing fleets were increasingly displaced from their traditional
fishing grounds, placing increasing pressure on stocks on the
high seas and straddling stocks.46 This shift quickly took its toll.
In 1994, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
reported that straddling fish stock catches in EEZs and high seas
had been declining since 1989, and that many highly migratory
fish stocks, including a majority of tuna species, were depleted,
in some cases, severely.47
In 1992, the participants at the UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development called for an intergovernmental confer-
ence under the auspices of the United Nations to address to
promote effective implementation of UNCLOS provisions
related to straddling stocks and highly migratory species.48 
In 1993, the UN General Assembly convened an intergovern-
mental conference, culminating in UNFSA. UNFSA entered
into force in December of 2001 and currently has 62 Parties,49
“including most States with significant interests in international
fisheries.”50
The Agreement’s overarching objective is to “ensure long-
term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks.”51 The Agreement’s primary
means of effectuating this is through engendering cooperation
between coastal States and States fishing on the high seas,
through, inter alia:
• Seeking agreement between coastal States and States on
the high seas to agree upon necessary measures for con-
servation of stocks in the high seas areas and straddling
stocks through direct agreements and cooperation in
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations;52
• Collecting and exchanging of critical data with respect to
straddling stocks and highly migratory species;53 and
• Expanding the duties of Flag States to ensure enforcement
of and compliance with the Convention’s provisions, as
well as the rights of other States, including port States, to
ensure compliance with the Agreement.54
However, the focus of UNFSA is on the relationship
between coastal States and States fishing in areas beyond EEZs,
there are a large number of provisions that could give rise to
claims associated with climate change impacts on straddling
stocks and highly migratory species. 
UNFSA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
It should be noted at the outset of this section that UNFSA
adopts the well-recognized “no harm rule” of international envi-
ronmental law,55 providing that “States Parties are liable in
accordance with international law for damage or loss attributa-
ble to them in regard to this Agreement.”56 Many of the provi-
sions of UNFSA, in turn, could provide the basis for a Party to
bring an action against one or more other Parties for climate-
related damages to fisheries.
As indicated above, the Agreement’s primary objective is to
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of strad-
dling fish stocks and highly migratory species,57 mandating that
its Parties take conservation and management measures to fur-
ther this objective. While the Agreement’s primary focus is on
the impacts of the harvesting of fish stocks, it clearly contem-
plates the regulation of other potential factors that could inflict
damages on fish stocks. For example, UNFSA requires the Par-
ties to assess the impacts of “other human activities and environ-
mental factors on target stocks and species belonging to the
same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target
stocks.”58
Moreover, the Agreement requires the Parties to “minimize
pollution.”59 While the Agreement does not define the term “pol-
lution,” given the relationship of the agreement to UNCLOS it
would seem reasonable to apply its definition of this term. In
pertinent part, UNCLOS defines “pollution of the marine envi-
ronment” as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of sub-
stances or energy into the marine environment . . .
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life . . .
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing.60
While rising ocean temperatures related to climate change
could not reasonably be construed as a “substance” under UNC-
LOS, it would likely be construed by a dispute resolution body
as “energy,” much as introduction of heat, such as waste water
from production processes, appears to fall under this rubric.61
Moreover, as developed above, the uptake of carbon dioxide into
the oceans can result in direct deleterious impacts on marine life,
which clearly brings carbon dioxide under the definition of a
polluting “substance” under UNCLOS. 
Where necessary, UNFSA also imposes obligations on the
Parties to adopt conservation and management measures for
“species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or
dependent upon target species” and to “protect biodiversity of
the marine environment.”62 Thus, to the extent that climate
change may diminish certain stocks, or alter their distribution in
a way that adversely affects the interests of discrete Parties, a
cause of action could arise under the Agreement.
Rare among international environmental agreements,
UNFSA provides for a binding dispute resolution mechanism
where efforts to resolve the dispute through non-binding meth-
ods proves to be unavailing. Part VIII of the Agreement applies
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the dispute resolution mechanism set out in Part XV of UNC-
LOS to any dispute under the Agreement, even where one or
more of the disputants are not Parties to UNCLOS.63
As one scholar observed, UNCLOS “creates a binding sys-
tem of obligations and dispute resolutions, which confers on a
forum international jurisdiction, authority, and implementing
powers that exceed those of other international environmental
law forums and rival those conferred on the World Trade Organi-
zation.”64 Part XV of UNCLOS provides States with four poten-
tial fora for settlement of disputes:65 the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”),66 the International Court of
Justice; an arbitral panel; or a special arbitral panel.67 States may
choose to declare their choice of forum, but in cases where they
have not, or Parties to a dispute have not accepted the same pro-
cedure for dispute settlement, the dispute must be submitted to
binding arbitration unless the Parties agree otherwise.68 To date,
the vast majority of Parties to UNCLOS have, de facto, chosen
arbitration by their silence on the matter, as have most Parties to
UNFSA.69
POTENTIAL BARRIERS
TO CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER UNFSA
A Party to UNFSA pursuing
an action based on climate
change damages would face
some imposing barriers, though
none need prove fatal.
General Causation
In many cases, declines of
fish stocks or shifts in distribu-
tion may be attributable to a
number of factors, including
over fishing,70 habitat destruc-
tion,71 or diminution of prey
species.72 A Party defending
itself against a claim of climate
change may thus contend that it
is not possible to link species decline or distribution shifts solely
to climatic factors, and thus it cannot be held liable under
UNFSA. This argument should not prevail. First, even if other
factors may constitute threats to regulated species, clearly, cli-
mate change is a substantial peril for many of these species. A
tribunal or panel could assess the extent of this threat by employ-
ing statistical probability analysis73 to support a finding of liabil-
ity at a reasonable level of probability. This would in turn trigger
the responsibility74 of major emitters of GHGs to adopt meas-
ures to reduce these emissions to levels that substantially reduce
the threat to high migratory and straddling stock species. Sec-
ond, UNFSA provides for wide application of the precautionary
approach to protect living marine resources.75 Thus, even under
scenarios of uncertainty about a given threat “[t]he absence of
adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for
postponing or failing to take conservation and management
measures.”76
Specific Causation
The target of a climate-related UNFSA action might argue
that climate change is caused by a multitude of anthropogenic
sources, and thus, any specific harm cannot be attributable to a
specific Party, even a large GHG emitting State such as the
United States. While this is certainly the case, an UNFSA action
likely would not seek monetary damages, where the issue of spe-
cific causation would be clearly germane. Rather a Party bring-
ing such an action would likely be seeking a commitment by the
targeted Party to fulfill its “duty to cooperate” under the treaty77
by enacting effective measures to contribute to the goal of “long-
term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks.”78 Thus, any Party failing to meet this obligation
could be found to be in violation of the treaty.
Reluctance of Dispute Resolution Bodies to 
Address Climate Change
Experience with climate change litigation to date in the
United States, at least, has
demonstrated some reluctance
on the part of members of the
judiciary to address climate
change issues given their lim-
ited scientific expertise. Con-
sider, for example, Justice
Scalia’s flippant but telling com-
ment in the recent oral argu-
ments in the recent Supreme
Court oral arguments in Massa-
chusetts, et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency:79
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . .
your assertion is that after
the pollutant leaves the air
and goes up into the strato-
sphere it is contributing to
global warming. 
MR. MILKEY: Respect-
fully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It’s the tro-
posphere. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you
before I’m not a scientist. 
(Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s why I don’t want to have to
deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.80
Parties bringing an action before ITLOS or an arbitral panel
might experience similar reservations on the part of the dispute
resolution body to grapple with the complicated technical issues
associated with climate change, especially since the primary
area of expertise of tribunal or panel members may be more tra-
ditional fisheries issues, such as the impact of harvesting on
species. UNFSA provides two mechanisms to help address this
concern. First, in cases where “a dispute concerns a matter of a
technical nature,” the States involved in a dispute may refer the
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many regions.
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Parties and seek to resolve the dispute without recourse to bind-
ing procedures.81 A Party seeking to press a climate change
claim could certainly seek to engage another Party in such nego-
tiations initially, and should this fail to resolve the dispute, seek
to introduce the panel’s scientific findings in a binding dispute
resolution forum. Additionally, if both Parties agree to it, cases
of this nature can be referred to a “special arbitral panel.” Under
UNCLOS’s dispute resolution provisions in this context, which
UNFSA fully incorporates, a panel hearing a climate change-
related dispute could be constituted by experts in the fields of
fisheries, marine environmental protection, marine scientific
research, drawn from the FAO, the United Nations Environment
Program and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion,82 all of whom have expertise on the nexus of fisheries and
climate change. 
Perhaps an even more imposing barrier to a cause of action
under UNFSA may be the perceived threat to the legitimacy of a
dispute resolution body should it enter a decision against a hege-
monic State. As Strauss observes, international tribunals care-
fully marshal their political capital in an effort to preserve and
enhance their legitimacy:
While the official function of international tribunals is
to find the pre-existing law; in reality, for judges to have
their decisions so accepted, they must engage in the
creative process of negotiating the differing global
interests to formulate results that are in accord with the
international community’s normative center of gravity.
In arriving at politically viable legal standards, in addi-
tion to formally reviewing submitted briefs and memo-
randa and informally reading other legal commentary,
judges engaged in a pragmatic assessment of the politi-
cal situation, by factoring in the relative power of the
protagonists and the interests of other important inter-
national actors.83
The primary threat to the legitimacy of a UNFSA dispute
resolution body in the context of climate change may be that a
powerful State would choose to not comply with the decision
given the dramatic policy changes that it might necessitate. As
Silk recently observed, States may choose to not to comply with
“binding” decisions when they deem it against their interests:
In international law, even allegedly binding dispute set-
tlement mechanisms such as arbitration may be ignored
when a state disagrees with the decision. To illustrate,
in the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and
Argentina, Argentina challenged the validity of the
arbitrators’ decision on dubious grounds and, despite
the implausibility of Argentina’s repudiation, the deci-
sion was never enforced . . . . Under UNCLOS, there
might be strong domestic and international pressures to
sign a fishery agreement regardless of the costs of com-
pliance, but when the time for compliance comes, nar-
rower national interests may prevail.84
Indeed, the fear that decisions against the United States
might be ignored may explain the recent decisions of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and World Heritage
Committee to reject petitions to address climate change under
these respective regimes.85
CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, the threat of climate change would be
effectively addressed through the international institutional
responses developed in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the specter of
climate change looms larger now than it did a decade ago, and
the prospects for adequate responses within the UNFCCC
framework appear increasingly remote. Now more than ever,
those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change must
explore alternatives that may finally galvanize the major green-
house emitting States into action. UNFSA is one option that
deserves further exploration.
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